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Anglo-American Technological Differences in 
Small Arms Manufacturing During the first half of the 
nineteenth century American manufacturers in a number of in-
dustries developed a distinctive method of production that has 
since come to be referred to as the American system of manufac-
tures. These methods were most advanced in woodworking, pre-
cision metalworking, and small arms manufacturing, where the 
use of specialized machinery and elaborate systems of measure-
ment made it possible to produce interchangeable parts that could 
be assembled without the extensive fitting and filing that was 
common in British industries at the time. 1 
The significance of these innovations is made clear by the 
interest manifested in them by contemporary British observers. 
In 1853 the British government dispatched several leading indus-
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1 To nineteenth-century observers it appeared that the methods historians refer to as the 
American system had eliminated the need for skilled hand labor in assembling complex 
mechanisms such as firearms. Writing about the Springfield Armory in 1845, George 
Talcott observed, for example, that " . . . the skill of the eye and the hand of the old 
practical armorer is entirely dispensed with . . . the machines having effected a total 
revolution." Quoted in Robert B . Gordon, "Who Turned the Mechanical Ideal into 
Mechanical Reality?" Technology and Culture, X X I X (1988), 747. Recent work by historians 
of technology suggests, however, that the reality was more complex. Although mecha-
nization was associated with a significant reduction in hand labor and an increase in 
precision, Gordon found that both physical and documentary evidence pointed to the 
continued importance of hand filing in shaping metal parts throughout much of the 
nineteenth century. For a description of the British discovery of American technological 
advances and the reproduction of the reports of British visitors to the United States, see 
Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), The American System of Manujactures (Edinburgh, 1969). David 
A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, i8oo-ig^2 (Baltimore, 1984), 
15 -65 , provides additional background regarding nineteenth-century perceptions of Amer-
ican manufacturing technology. 
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trialists to study American methods firsthand, and several years 
later it undertook the establishment of a government-run armory 
employing American methods, equipped largely with American 
machinery. Describing the innovations that they had seen during 
their visit to the United States, members of the Committee on 
Machinery observed that: 
In consequence of the scarcity and high price of labor in the United 
States, and the extreme desire manifested by masters and workmen 
to adopt all labour-saving appliances . . . a considerable number of 
different trades are carried on . . . in large factories, with machinery 
applied to almost every process, the extreme subdivision of labour 
and all reduced to an almost perfect system of manufactures.2 
Although there n o w exists an extensive literature attempting 
to explain the divergence of American and British manufacturing 
techniques during the nineteenth century, less attention has been 
devoted to the extent to which the so-called American system 
was diffused throughout the United States economy. I use data 
on the structure of the American small arms industry, drawn 
from the 1840 and 1850 censuses of manufacturing, to trace the 
diffusion of the American system within this industry. The data 
indicate that as late as 1840 the techniques noted by British ob-
servers in the 1850s had been adopted only in government ar-
mories and within the small circle of manufacturers producing 
weapons on contract for the United States government; outside 
of this circle there persisted a large number of artisanal shops 
employing more traditional methods of production. 3 
The importance of the military in promoting the develop-
ment of interchangeable parts production and other aspects of the 
American system has been recognized by historians of technology 
for some time. What has not previously been noted, however, is 
2 Report of the Committee on the Machinery in the United States of America: Presented to the 
House of Commons in Pursuance of Their Address of the 10th July 1855, in Rosenberg, The 
American System, 128. 
3 Small arms production was only one of a number of industries in which the American 
system was visible. However, small arms manufacturers are widely regarded as having 
introduced many of the techniques that characterized the American system, and British 
observers devoted much of their attention to small arms manufacturers, suggesting that 
if they could understand the development of that one industry it could shed light on 
developments in other industries as well. On the importance of small arms manufacturing 
in the development of the American system, see Rosenberg, American System, 66-72; 
Hounshell, From the American System, 4-5 , 1 5 -65 . 
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the slow diffusion of the techniques of the American system 
beyond government armories and government contractors, and 
the persistence of a substantial traditional sector as late as the 
middle of the nineteenth century. These facts are significant be-
cause they are inconsistent with the explanations most commonly 
advanced by economic historians for the emergence of the Amer-
ican system, which assume that it represented an optimal response 
to general macroeconomic conditions in the United States. 4 
Despite the detailed descriptions provided by British observ-
ers at the time, economic historians have not been able to agree 
about precisely how to characterize the differences between Amer-
ican and British manufacturing techniques. From the perspective 
of modern economic theory, nineteenth-century descriptions can 
be interpreted in two conceptually distinct ways: (i) Americans 
used more machinery, or (2) Americans used better machinery than 
their British counterparts. Whichever interpretation they have 
favored, however, most economic historians have attempted to 
explain the divergence of American and British technology as the 
consequence of differences in relative factor abundance between 
the two countries. Proponents of the view that Americans used 
more machinery have explained this choice as a simple substitu-
tion along the unit isoquant in response to the relative abundance 
of land and the consequent higher cost of labor in the United 
States. Proponents of the better machinery interpretation have 
argued that initial differences in factor proportions were trans-
formed into differences in technology through a process o f local-
ized learning. 5 
4 Despite the common interest of economic historians and historians of technology in 
the origins of the American system, research in each discipline has proceeded largely in 
isolation from the other. Whereas historians of technology have amassed considerable 
evidence of the importance of military sponsorship in the development of the American 
system, they have not directly confronted the hypotheses commonly advanced by eco-
nomic historians to explain the emergence of the American system. On the importance 
of the military in promoting interchangeability see Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry 
Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca, 1977); idem, "Army 
Ordnance an the 'American system' of Manufacturing, 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 6 1 , " in idem, (ed.), Military 
Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1985), 28-46; Hounshell, From the American System. 
5 H. J . Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century: The Search 
for Labour-Saving Inventions (Cambridge, 1962) is largely responsible for initiating discus-
sion of the American system among economic historians. Peter Temin, "Labor Scarcity 
and the Problem of American Industrial Efficiency in the 1850s," Journal of Economic 
History, X X V I (1966), 277-298; idem, "Labor Scarcity in America," Journal of Interdiscipli-
nary History, I ( 1971) , 251-264, suggested the distinction between the more machines and 
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Ames and Rosenberg offer one of the few exceptions to the 
supply-side approach typical in most explanations of the Ameri -
can system. They argue instead that mass-produced American 
rifles were a qualitatively different product from the handcrafted 
guns turned out by British artisans and that it is fruitless to 
attempt to characterize production methods in terms of aggregate 
capital-labor ratios. Instead, they suggest that the choice of dif-
ferent production methods in the two countries might reflect the 
larger size of the American market and the greater willingness of 
American consumers to purchase standardized, mass-produced 
products. 6 
Despite disagreement about what needs to be explained and 
how to explain it, all o f these accounts assume that the techniques 
characteristic of the American system were an optimal response 
to the circumstances in which American manufacturers found 
themselves. If so, then the expectation is that in the absence of 
high transportation cost barriers, producers using traditional hand-
icraft methods would eventually be driven out of business by 
their lower cost competitors. That this did not occur raises serious 
questions about the ability of macroeconomic conditions, such as 
relative factor abundance or the characteristics of consumer de-
mand, to explain the course of development of American manu-
facturing technology in the nineteenth century. Rather, I will 
better machines hypotheses, and examined the conditions under which land abundance 
and labor scarcity will in fact lead to a higher capital-labor ratio. For further discussion 
of this topic see Robert Fogel, "The Specification Problem in Economic History," Journal 
of Economic History, X X V I I (1967), 283-308; Paul Uselding, "Studies in Technology in 
Economic History/' in Robert E. Gallman (ed.), Recent Developments in the Study of Business 
and Economic History: Essays in Memory of Herman E. Kroos (Greenwich, Conn., 1977), 
159-220. The principal complication that the factor substitution argument must confront 
is the evidence that at least at the aggregate level Americans actually used less capital per 
worker than did the British, and that interest rates as well as wages were higher in America 
than in Britain. On aggregate capital-labor ratios, and the appropriateness of interpreting 
Anglo-American differences in this way, see Alexander James Field, "Land Abundance, 
Interest/Profit Rates, and Nineteenth-Century American and British Technology,"Journal 
of Economic History, XLIII (1983), 405-431 ; idem, "On the Unimportance of Machinery," 
Explorations in Economic History, X X I I (1985), 378-401. John A. James and Jonathan S. 
Skinner, "The Resolution of the Labor-Scarcity Paradox,'* Journal of Economic History, 
X L V (1985), 513-540, offered one possible resolution to this problem. Paul A . David, 
Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth: Essays on American and British Experience 
in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1975), 19-94, is the principal statement of the better 
machinery interpretation. An isoquant is the set of inputs that give rise to a constant 
quantity of output. 
6 Edward Ames and Rosenberg, "The Enfield Arsenal in Theory and History," Economic 
Journal, L X X V I I I (1968), 827-842. 
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show that the emergence of the American system of manufactur-
ing in the production of small arms is attributable primarily to 
the distinctive characteristics of American military demand, and 
the direct involvement of the A r m y Ordnance Department in 
developing technologies capable of meeting the standards of in-
terchangeability that it had established. Only after an extended 
period of gestation under military sponsorship did the techniques 
developed in producing firearms for the military become attrac-
tive to manufacturers serving the private market. Although it is 
difficult precisely to identify the point at which armory methods 
became competitive in the production for the private sector, the 
transition appears to have occurred by the early 1850s. 7 
T H E S T R U C T U R E OF T H E A M E R I C A N S M A L L A R M S I N D U S T R Y The 
published returns of the 1840 and 1850 censuses of manufactures 
depict fairly accurately the structure of the American small arms 
industry. Whereas these sources do not contain information about 
the methods of production used by different manufacturers, they 
do contain information on the scale of production at different 
establishments. Because interchangeable parts production entailed 
large fixed costs for the construction of special purpose machinery 
and the implementation of elaborate systems of measurement, it 
could only have been practical at a relatively large scale of pro-
duction. Thus size may be used as a proxy for the method of 
production. 8 
The published returns of the 1840 census are particularly 
illuminating because they provide information on the number of 
persons employed and the number of guns produced at the town-
ship or county level. The 1850 census returns provide consider-
ably more detailed information—the value of production, the cost 
of raw materials, the value of capital employed, and the number 
of men and women employed—but the published returns are 
aggregated at the state level, making it impossible to determine 
the size of individual establishments. Some aggregation is prob-
ably inevitable in the 1840 census as well, but it is likely that in 
7 Hounshell, From the American System, 46-50, argued that the opening of the new Colt 
Armory in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1855 marked the beginning of the successful appli-
cation of armory practice to production primarily for the private market. 
8 The data are from U.S . Department of State, The Sixth Census, 1840 (Washington, 
D .C . , 1841) ; U .S . Department of the Interior, Abstract of the Statistics of Manufactures, 
Seventh Census, 1850 (Washington, D.C. , 1858). 
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most cases only one establishment was present in a township or 
county. To the extent that aggregation is a problem, however, it 
will bias the case in favor of finding larger establishments. Since 
I argue that there were few large establishments, I take each 
observation to represent a single establishment. 
Several sources of inaccuracy are present in the census data. 
First, the census coverage was probably incomplete. However, 
since small producers were the ones most likely to be missed by 
census enumerators, there is little risk that establishments large 
enough to have employed interchangeable parts production meth-
ods would not have been counted. Second, the data reported may 
be incorrect. For 1840 it was possible to test for the internal 
consistency of the data reported for each observation, thus I was 
able to correct thirteen observations. 9 
The 1840 census shows that guns were produced in at least 
306 locations in 25 states. The size of these establishments can be 
measured in terms of either employment or production. Table 1 
shows the size distribution of gun producers for both these mea-
sures, assuming that each observation represents a single estab-
lishment. 
The two largest establishments by either criterion were the 
federal armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry. Combined, 
they accounted for 22,850 guns, or more than one-third of total 
United States production, and 522 workers. Almost all of the 
private producers were small. In only one-sixth of the other 
locations did employment exceed four workers. Employment 
exceeded ten workers in just twenty places, and in only eight of 
these were more than twenty men employed in gun making. 
These same eight locations were the only ones in which produc-
9 To check the internal consistency of the observations, I computed the labor productivity 
implied in each case by dividing the number of guns produced by the number of employees 
plus one (to take account of the proprietor's labor). The average labor productivity was 
27.26 guns with a standard deviation of 63.08. It seems safe to assume that the 13 
observations with productivities more than one standard deviation above the mean (all of 
them greater than 130) were the result of errors in recording or reporting. In all cases it 
appeared that the number of guns produced had been inflated by an order of magnitude. 
To confirm this conclusion I checked the listing of gun makers compiled by Leroy D. 
Satterlee and Arcadi Gluckman, American Gun Makers (Buffalo, 1940) to see that there 
were no major gun makers in any of the locations that had establishments with unusually 
high productivities. To correct these observations I used the number of guns reported in 
the census divided by 10. 
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Table 1 The Size Distribution of Small Arms Producers in 1840 
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GUNS 
SIZE OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS PRODUCED 
N u m b e r o f Employees 
0 - 1 I l 8 38.6 2,485 
2 84 27 .5 3,468 
3 29 9-5 2,305 
4 23 7-5 2 , 1 1 3 
5 - 9 30 9-8 5,309 
1 0 - 1 9 1 2 3-9 4,801 
2 0 - 2 9 8 2.6 2 1 , 7 8 2 
240 1 0.4 8,850 
280 1 0.4 14,000 
N u m b e r o f Guns Produced 
0 - 2 4 106 34-6 1 ,346 
2 5 - 4 9 61 19.9 1,963 
5 0 - 9 9 60 19.6 3 , 7 3 2 
1 0 0 - 4 9 9 66 2 1 . 6 1 1 , 7 8 6 
500-999 3 1.0 2,054 
1 , 0 0 0 - 2 , 4 9 9 5 1-7 8,950 
2 , 4 9 9 - 8 , 0 0 0 3 1.0 1 2 , 8 3 2 
8,850 1 0.4 8,850 
14,000 1 0.4 14,000 
NOTES Distributions computed under the assumption of one establishment 
per location. Thirteen observations corrected as described in the text. Percentages 
may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
S O U R C E U . S . Department of State, Sixth Census, 1840 (Washington, D.C . , 
1841). 
tion exceeded 1,000 guns in 1840, whereas production in only 
three other places exceeded 500 guns. 
O f the eight locations with the largest private employment 
and production of guns, six clustered near the Springfield A r -
m o r y — t w o in Massachusetts, three in Connecticut, and one in 
Vermont. The remaining two locations were Albany, N e w York , 
and Paterson, N e w Jersey. In contrast to the close proximity of 
the largest private centers of production to the government ar-
mories, medium-sized centers o f production, those places with 
employment of ten to nineteen workers, were mostly located near 
western and southern markets. Establishments in N e w Y o r k and 
Philadelphia employed more than ten men each, but the other 
locations with employment in the ten-to-nineteen range were in 
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rural Pennsylvania (five places), Kentucky (two places), Virginia, 
and Alabama (one place each) . 1 0 
Many of the small establishments that are listed in the census 
were located in remote areas, but a considerable number of them 
operated in close proximity to much larger establishments, sug-
gesting that transportation cost barriers alone cannot account for 
their survival. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, for example, 
there were nine establishments employing from one to five per-
sons, and producing less than 120 guns per year. Many more 
small producers were located in the surrounding states of N e w 
York, Vermont, and N e w Hampshire, which were served by a 
well-developed transportation system by this date. 
T o translate information on the size of small arms producers 
into a measure of the diffusion of the American system, it is 
necessary to k n o w h o w big an establishment had to be to recoup 
the fixed costs of interchangeable parts production. Several rough 
measures of this size are possible. At the Springfield Armory, 
where the methods necessary to ensure precise measurement were 
pioneered, their introduction necessitated an extensive division of 
labor. Prior to the introduction o f these methods, eleven distinct 
occupations were employed at the armory, but the development 
of a system of gauges and fixtures capable of producing inter-
changeable parts led to an increase in the number of occupations 
to thirty-four in 1 8 1 5 , eighty-six in 1820, and 100 in 1825. B y 
this standard just eight establishments were large enough to im-
plement the division o f labor employed at Springfield in 1 8 1 5 . 
Even if we suppose that as few as seventeen employees—half the 
number of occupations at Springfield in 1 8 1 5 — w e r e necessary to 
implement the system employed at the armory, the number of 
establishments capable of interchangeable parts production would 
increase to only e leven . 1 1 
10 The eight largest centers of production outside the federal armories were (with 
employment in parentheses): Millbury, Mass. (71); Middletown, Conn. (70); Paterson, 
N J . (70); Weathersfield, Conn. (40); Windsor, Vt. (40); Albany, N . Y . (35); Pittsfield, 
Mass. (30); Hamden, Conn. (30). The likely identities of producers in these locations are 
discussed below in n. 1 3 . In addition to N e w York and Philadelphia, the locations with 
employment of 1 0 - 1 9 workers were: Lancaster, West Cocalico, Comro, Bushkill, Spring 
in Pennsylvania; Louisville, Washington in Kentucky; Guilford, Virginia; Lauderdale, 
Alabama. 
1 1 Felicia Johnson Deyrup, "Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley: A Regional Study 
of the Economic Development of the Small Arms Industry, 1 798- 1870 , " Smith College 
Studies in History, X X X I I I (Northampton, Mass., 1948), 90-91 . 
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O n the basis of production, a minimum of 1,000 guns would 
appear to be a conservative estimate of the level of production 
necessary to justify the expense of interchangeable parts produc-
tion. In the 1830s, John Hall, who was producing a breech-loading 
rifle using a number of machines of his own invention, com-
plained that because the government would only contract for 
1,000 rifles a year his costs were considerably higher than they 
might be at a higher volume. In fact, he estimated that he could 
produce nearly three times as many rifles at little additional cost. 
Using this criterion, only eight of the private producers of small 
arms would have been capable of employing the techniques of 
the American system. Even if we were to lower the threshold 
scale to 500 guns a year, this number would only increase by 
three. 1 2 
Virtually all of the private producers who appear to have 
been capable of employing the methods of the American system 
in 1840 were producing guns for the United States military. From 
biographical material on American arms makers collected by Sat-
terlee and Gluckman, it is possible to identify the manufacturers 
in six of the eight locations in which 1,000 or more guns were 
produced, and in four of those locations the manufacturers had 
contracts with the military in 1840. Moreover, the two manufac-
turers w h o did not have government contracts both failed in 1842, 
confirming the central role of military demand in making large-
scale production methods v iable . 1 3 
B y 1840 the technological foundations of the American 
method of small arms production were already well established. 
It is possible, however, that producers employing traditional pro-
12 Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory, 37. 
13 The producers listed as government contractors by Satterlee and Gluckman were: 
Asa Waters, Millbury, Mass.; Nathan Starr, Simeon North, Robert Johnson, Middletown, 
Conn.; Lemuel Pomeroy, Pittsfield, Mass.; P. & E. W. Blake, Hamden, Conn. Only 
Samuel Colt, Paterson, N.J . (producing 2,000 guns) and Kendall & Co . , Windsor, Vt. 
(producing 1,000 guns) do not appear to have had government contracts. N o entries could 
be located for gun makers in either Albany, N.Y . or Weathersfield, Conn., the two other 
locations for which production of more than 1,000 guns was reported. 
Colt's Patent Arms Manufacturing Company failed in 1842 due to "lack of public 
and government support." Kendall & C o . also ceased operations in 1842, although the 
reasons why the firm gave up gun production are not clear. Several years later Nicanor 
Kendall joined with Samuel E. Robbins and Richard S. Lawrence to establish the firm of 
Robbins, Kendall & Lawrence, which in 1845 received a substantial government contract 
for the production of the Model 1841 rifle. Satterlee and Gluckman, American Gun Makers, 
22, 32, 80, 84, 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , 127, 136, 154, 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 . 
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duction methods responded only s lowly to the competitive pres-
sures created by the large-scale producers. If these competitive 
pressures indeed existed, w e would expect them to be reflected 
in changes in the structure of the industry over the succeeding 
decade. 
The published returns of the 1850 census are too highly 
aggregated to permit inferences about the persistence of individual 
establishments, but it is possible to compare average employment 
and production by state in 1840 and 1850. As Table 2 shows, 
there was remarkably little change at this level during the 1840s. 
In most of the N e w England and Mid-Atlantic states the number 
of establishments did fall, but the effect of this consolidation 
resulted in an increase in average employment in just slightly less 
than half of the states in these reg ions . 1 4 
The survival as late as 1850 of many gun producers, who 
were too small to have employed the techniques of the American 
system, suggests that if there were any cost savings associated 
with the adoption of these methods in production for the civilian 
market, they were modest. To further understand this question I 
used data from the 1850 census directly to estimate the extent of 
any economies of scale that did exist. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, value added per worker (V/L) can be written 
as V / L = A ( K / L ) a L b , where A is a constant, K/L is the capital-
labor ratio, and L is the number of workers. Taking logarithms 
of both sides of this expression produces a linear specification that 
can be estimated by ordinary least squares. A regression across 
states using the 1850 data yields (t-statistics in parentheses): 
log(V/L) = 4.838 + o.743log(K/L) + o.042log(L) 
(5.466) (1.458) (0.854) 
R 2 = . 1 1 9 
The coefficient on log(L) is a direct measure of the extent of any 
economies of scale. The estimated value of this coefficient in 1850 
is quite small, and the null hypothesis that is equal to zero cannot 
be rejected at standard confidence levels. Thus, it appears that at 
least as late as 1840, and possibly 1850, adoption of the methods 
14 Alternatively, the persistence of traditional production methods could be explained if 
they were used to produce a qualitatively different product than the military weapons 
produced by government armories and contractors. 
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1840 1850 
AVERAGE AVERAGE 
STATE NUMBER EMPLOYMENT NUMBER EMPLOYMENT 
N E W E N G L A N D 
Maine 2 2.0 0 — 
N e w Hampshire 2 3.5 2 1-5 
Massachusetts 12 33-1 10 2 1 .0 
Rhode Island 0 I 2.0 
Connecticut 6 24.7 8 38.I 
Vermont 5 8.4 2 3-5 
M I D - A T L A N T I C 
N e w York 64 3-1 46 6.2 
N e w Jersey 2 36.O 3 3-0 
Pennsylvania 58 3.0 55 4.8 
Maryland 1 3.0 1 1 7-4 
Washington, D . C . 0 — 1 3-1 
M I D W E S T 
Ohio 28 2.5 29 2.8 
Indiana 22 2. I 24 1.6 
Illinois 1 1 I . I 14 1.6 
Iowa 1 2.0 2 2.0 
Missouri 10 4-8 24 i-7 
Michigan 3 2.0 3 1.7 
Wisconsin 1 1 .0 4 1.3 
S O U T H A T L A N T I C 
Virginia 1 1 23.8 14 3-1 
North Carolina 0 — 9 2.1 
South Carolina 2 3-5 3 2.7 
Georgia 4 1-3 10 2.8 
S O U T H C E N T R A L 
Alabama 1 16.0 2 2.0 
Mississippi 5 1 .4 1 1.0 
Tennessee 12 2.8 15 2.1 
Kentucky 33 3-2 22 2.0 
Arkansas 1 1 .0 0 
S O U R C E S U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Sixth Census, 1840 (Washington, D . C . , 1 8 4 1 ) ; U . S . 
D e p a r t m e n t o f the Interior, Abstract of the Statistics of Manufactures, Seventh Census, 1850 (Washington, 
D . C . , 1 8 5 8 ) . 
of production characteristic o f the American system conveyed 
little or no competitive advantage to small arms manufacturers. 1 5 
E X P L A I N I N G T H E E M E R G E N C E OF T H E A M E R I C A N S Y S T E M If the 
development of the American system in small arms production 
15 Value added is computed as the difference between the reported value of output and 
Table 2 Number of Establishments and Average Employment by State 
in 1840 and 1850 
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the cost of raw materials. The labor input is the number of male employees (no women 
were employed in any of the establishments), and the capital input is the value of the 
capital stock reported in the census. The true relationship between productive efficiency 
and scale may possibly be masked by the aggregation of the data. If, however, across-
state variations in size were more important than within-state variations, then it will be 
possible to use the aggregated data. See John A. James, "Structural Change in American 
Manufacturing, 1850-1890, "Journal of Economic History, XLIII 43 (1983), 457-458, which 
uses state average data for a number of industries to estimate economies of scale in the 
nineteenth century. The specification of the production function is identical to that used 
in Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Was the Transition from the Artisanal Shop to the Nonmechan-
ized Factory Associated with Gains in Efficiency?: Evidence from the U .S . Manufacturing 
Censuses of 1820 and 1850," Explorations in Economic History, X X I (1984), 351-382. The 
results in the text are consistent with estimates of the more conventional specification of 
the production function, which yields (t-statistics in parentheses): 
log(V) = 5.430 + o.9i9log(L) + o.i22log(K) 
(10.80) (8.956) (1.392) 
R 2 = .954 
which also indicates that economies of scale were insignificant. 
did not represent an optimal adaptation to supply or demand 
conditions, as the survival of small manufacturers employing 
more traditional techniques indicates, w h y did mechanization and 
interchangeable parts production emerge in the United States 
during the first half of the nineteenth century? The answer, as 
suggested by the fact that virtually all of the producers large 
enough to be employing the methods of the American system 
were government contractors, lies in the role of United States 
military demand for guns during this period. 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, the United States 
remained largely dependent upon European suppliers to outfit its 
armed forces. In the 1790s, however, growing hostility between 
the United States and France prompted federal efforts to establish 
a domestic source of supply. Federal armories were established at 
Springfield and Harpers Ferry, and Congress appropriated 
$800,000 for the purchase of cannon, small arms, and ammunition 
from private arms makers. The few skilled gunsmiths in the 
country were ill-equipped to respond to the huge volume of 
production required by the government, however, and most of 
the government's contracts went to enterprising manufacturers 
from other industries, such as Eli Whitney, who were attracted 
by the large sums of money involved. The government's decision 
to offer large contracts and allow contractors generous advances 
against them was in Deyrup's judgment extremely important in 
establishing early private manufacturers on an "industrial foot-
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ing," because the certainty of a steady income made possible and 
desirable the heavy investments that large-scale production re-
quired. 1 6 
From the beginning the government urged contractors to 
develop methods of production using interchangeable parts. The 
idea of interchangeability, or "uniformity" as it was most com-
monly called at the time, has been traced to the French military, 
where it emerged sometime during the 1760s as part of a larger 
effort to rationalize the French army. American interest in the 
idea was likely stimulated by the presence of French military 
advisors during the American Revolution. In addition, Thomas 
Jefferson, who had learned of French efforts to implement inter-
changeability during his stay in France, became an early advocate 
of this goal at the highest levels of government. Despite this 
interest, little progress toward interchangeability was made before 
1 8 1 0 . 1 7 
The expansion of demand during the War of 18 12 combined 
with the shortage of skilled gunsmiths led government contractors 
to search for ways of substituting less skilled for skilled artisans. 
To make use of less skilled workers they were obliged to develop 
a variety of gauges and fixtures to guide their work. Along with 
these new methods of measurement they introduced an extensive 
division of labor encouraging specialization along narrow func-
tional lines. A n additional factor that may have encouraged prog-
ress toward interchangeability at this time was its practicality in 
light of the large stock of damaged weapons left unusable during 
the war. Their repair required the attention of a master gun-
smith. 1 8 
Both private contractors and the federal armories contributed 
to the development of new production methods after 18 12 . It was 
the federal armory at Springfield that perfected most of them, 
16 Deyrup, "Arms Makers," 36-38. On Whitney's motivations for seeking government 
contracts for the production of small arms see Robert S. Woodbury, "The Legend of Eli 
Whitney and Interchangeable Parts," Technology and Culture, I (i960), 235-253; Hounshell, 
From the American System, 3 1 . 
17 Hounshell, From the American System, 25-27; Smith, " A r m y Ordnance." 
18 Deyrup, "Arms Makers," 87-88; Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory, 1 0 6 - 1 1 2 . Gordon, 
"Mechanical Ideal," 769-777, argued that the increased division of labor and the intro-
duction of more elaborate systems of measurement in precision metal-working did not so 
much eliminate the need for skilled labor as substitute one set of skills for another. All-
around craft skills became less important, but new skills—especially manual dexterity and 
resourcefulness in dealing with variations in the quality of materials—remained important 
qualifications for artificers. 
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developing an elaborate system of gauges to assure the nearly 
complete uniformity of components. Subsequently the armory 
lent its master copies to private contractors so that they could 
reproduce t h e m . 1 9 
The introduction of better methods of making critical mea-
surements was followed by efforts to mechanize the production 
process. At first these concentrated mainly on the shaping of gun 
barrels, which was difficult and hazardous to do by hand. B e -
tween 18 16 an 18 19 at least five different barrel-turning machines 
were developed by both private contractors and mechanics at the 
federal armories. One of the most promising of these was devel-
oped by Thomas Blanchard, a mechanic employed by Asa Waters, 
a government contractor. B y tracing out the shape of a master 
pattern, Blanchard's machine could shape both the cylindrical and 
flat portions of the barrel. Government inspectors related the 
details of Blanchard's innovation to Roswell Lee, the director of 
the Springfield Armory , and a contract was soon signed for the 
construction at the armory of several machines based on the same 
principle. 2 0 
Recognizing the broader applicability of the methods em-
bodied in his barrel-shaping machine, Blanchard applied them to 
a series of machines designed to produce irregularly shaped 
wooden gunstocks. Shortly after seeing a demonstration of these 
machines, Lee put Blanchard on the armory payroll. Even though 
Lee believed that the machines already developed by Blanchard 
would reduce the cost o f producing gunstocks, he emphasized 
that the "principal object is to bring the machinery to the most 
perfect state." In other words, Lee believed that government 
support was necessary to promote the development of a technol-
ogy that was unlikely to receive further support from the private 
sector. From his arrival at Springfield in 1823 until 1827, Blan-
chard steadily elaborated and improved upon his original inven-
tion, ultimately producing fourteen separate machines to carry 
out different steps in the production of gunstocks. 2 1 
19 Deyrup, "Arms Makers," 89, 9 1 -92 . 
20 Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory, 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 , 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ; Deyrup, "Arms Makers," 93-94. 
21 For a detailed description of Blanchard's contributions see Carolyn C. Cooper, Shaping 
Invention: Thomas Blanchard's Machinery and Patent Management in Nineteenth-Century Amer-
ica (New York, 1991)- On the role of government sponsorship of Blanchard's innovations 
see Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 . The development of the Blanchard 
lathe was not the only instance in which the government directly supported research and 
development aimed at improving methods of producing small arms. Another notable 
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With the perfection o f methods of measurement and major 
breakthroughs in the construction of special purpose machinery, 
the major technical foundations of the American method o f small 
arms production were established by the early 1830s. As the 
capacity of the federal armories grew, the Army Ordnance D e -
partment became increasingly dissatisfied with its contract sys-
tem, charging that the quality of the privately supplied weapons 
was lower than that of those produced at the armories, whereas 
their cost was greater. Yet , uncertainty about future contracts 
made private producers increasingly reluctant to make the sub-
stantial investments in new tools and machinery needed to keep 
up with modifications in the design of military weapons, and 
many of them eventually abandoned small arms manufacturing 
altogether. While the government contractors were disappearing 
during the late 1830s and 1840s, a new group of manufacturers— 
epitomized by patent arms makers like Samuel Colt; Robbins, 
Kendall, & Lawrence; and E. Remington & Sons—began to adapt 
the armory techniques to production for the private market. But 
it was only at this time that these techniques first began to appear 
commercially viable in the private market. Without government 
sponsorship and inducements, it appears unlikely that private 
producers would have developed such methods in nonmilitary 
markets . 2 2 
In contrast to the early and continuing involvement of the 
United States government in the production of small arms, the 
British government relied almost entirely on contracts with pri-
vate producers and made no effort to induce them to develop new 
production methods. Although meeting large wartime demand 
for guns strained the capacity of private producers in Britain as it 
did in the United States, British producers were better equipped 
example is the support provided to John Hall, an extremely important contributor to the 
development of techniques for shaping metal components crucial to the achievement of 
effectively interchangeable parts production. See Ibid., 184-251 , for an extensive discussion 
of Hall's contributions and the role of government support in their achievement. 
22 Hounshell, From the American System, 46-50. Interestingly, even when the patent arms 
producers did adopt armory methods they often did not attempt to achieve the level of 
interchangeability upon which the A r m y Ordnance Department had insisted. Examination 
of pistols produced for the private sector around i860 shows that parts could not be 
readily interchanged. The level of precision required was simply too costly and the private 
demand for interchangeability too limited for it to be economically rational. See Robert 
A. Howard, "Interchangeable Parts Reexamined: The Private Sector of the American 
Arms Industry on the Eve of the Civil War," Technology and Culture, X I X (1978), 633— 
649. 
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to meet military demand than were the few small American pro-
ducers. B y the late eighteenth century, the Birmingham area had 
emerged as one of the world's leading centers of small arms 
production. As military demand expanded, gunsmiths employed 
in production for the private market could switch to the more 
lucrative military trade, and skilled craftsmen could be recruited 
from other metal-using industries that concentrated around Bir-
mingham. Nonetheless, the British military expressed continuing 
dissatisfaction with the quality and price of guns purchased from 
private producers. Their efforts to establish government armories 
had to contend, however, with the presence of a large and well-
established private industry that successfully lobbied to prevent 
any departure from the use of private contractors. 2 3 
Economic historians have sought to explain the divergence of 
American and British manufacturing technologies during the first 
half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of optimal adap-
tation to differences in either factor abundance or consumer de-
mand. Examination of the structure of the American small arms 
industry between 1840 and 1850 indicates, however, that the in-
troduction of mechanized production using interchangeable parts 
conveyed little or no competitive advantage. Historians of tech-
nology have long recognized that military demand played an 
important role in fostering the development of the manufacturing 
techniques that struck mid-century British observers as so start-
ling, but the evidence presented here confirms that without mil-
itary sponsorship the private sector would have been unlikely to 
develop these methods. Only around the middle of the nineteenth 
century did the techniques of the American system become com-
petitive in production for the private market. On the one hand, 
this suggests that there is less to explain about Anglo-American 
technological differences than first appears. On the other hand, it 
reinforces the view that the development of new technologies is 
a path-dependent process in which historical accidents can signif-
icantly alter the course of economic development. 
23 This paragraph draws heavily on the discussion of the British small arms industry in 
Rosenberg, American System, 30-36, 39. See also, Russell I. Fries, "British Response to 
the American System: the Case of the Small-Arms Industry after 1850, " Technology and 
Culture, X V I (1975), 377-405. 
